by Madi MooreIn Chapter 6 of The Encultured Brain, Downey uses two forms of inverted balancing in different settings to explore the cultural adoptions of sensory systems, including equilibrium systems. The first act of balancing Downey describes is the Capoeira bananeira. A bananeira is essentially a dynamic, highly mobile, and responsive handstand technique within the dance-like martial art form known as Capoeira. Capoeira originated in Brazil, specifically from slaves who were taken from Africa and brought to Brazil. Downey also describes in this chapter a second form of inverted balancing: a static, symmetrical, and rigid handstand as seen in Olympic gymnastics.
Our sense of balance and equilibrium system are both extremely complex. The vestibular system is located in the inner ear and includes semicircular canals and otoliths. In general, sensations from the inner ear organs help humans with body positioning, including while stationary and during movements. In addition to the equilibrium system, other sensory systems, including vision, proprioception, and pressure perception, aid in body positioning and balance. Downey defines our sense of balance as being essentially a “synthesis of diverse afferences and often-unconscious compensatory behavior” (p 174). The brain comes into conversation in Chapter 6 when discussing the plasticity of the equilibrium system in reference to the two types of balancing techniques introduced in the beginning of the chapter. This plasticity allows the brain system to be malleable and to have the ability to change or adapt, depending on many external and internal variables. The regular handstand and the bananeira both require intensive practice and skill, but when comparing the two, one is able to see the many differences in external and internal factors that allow performers of each handstand technique to successfully maintain different types inverted balances. In a sense, bananeira practitioners and gymnasts have completely different “acquired” equilibrium systems that allow for different highly skilled sensory and perceptual processes. These “acquired” equilibrium systems are a result of vestibular conditioning in different cultural contexts. To successfully maintain balance in an inverted position, one must train equilibrium systems. An example of a training technique that is used with performers who vigorously spin around includes “spotting”. The “spotting” technique includes “holding one’s head steady and visually fixing on a point” in space every so often (p 180). Initially, spotting is a very conscious task that is learned. Eventually, spotting becomes automatic. What are the underlying mechanisms for how this happens? In some spinning capoeira techniques, practitioners do not use the “spotting” technique. This example demonstrates the implementation of other balance-related techniques that are acquired through cultural factors, in addition to the brain’s plasticity. When discussing chapter 6, specifically as performers and practitioners increase their handstand skill levels, it is important to question how external factors become integrated and ingrained by the human body in not only an anthropological sense, but also in a biological sense. How do those external factors become embodied in a more physiological sense? In chapter 6, Downey seamlessly unites the cultural anthropological side with the biological neuroscience side of neuroanthropology by using two culturally and biomechanically different forms of handstands. Finally, Downey states that “as neuroanthropology develops, cultural sites of training will be ideal settings in which to study enculturation” (p 188). What other aspects will be useful to study enculturation as the field of neuroanthropology grows? What other aspects will be useful to study capacities for enculturation?
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by Jennifer FortunatoIn this paper, Larsson and Karlefors investigate physical education and how it plays into movement culture. The authors define movement culture by quoting an earlier paper on movement culture by Crum (1993), “[Movement culture] is how a social group deals with the need and desire for movement beyond labor or maintaining life.” To understand what movement culture can assist in understanding how it can be applied to physical education.
There is initial discussion of how physical education is lacking by going over what element are lacking in the physical education system. The authors state that there is a lack of time dedicated to the content of the course, the physical exercises are decontextualized, and that teacher have a lack of understanding of each of the sports that they are supposed to be teaching the students. There is an assertion within the paper for physical education to be a planned introduction and have lasting participation in movement culture. This assertion is where the authors come in to state their objective of identifying of how this assertion relates to physical education in Swedish schools. Larsson and Karlefors then introduce how movement culture is identified in physical education. The authors extend movement culture to the logic of practice, which is what people do in social settings according to previous rules where the actions make sense. This is alternative to how many researchers analyze physical activities (identifying motivation of individuals and the function of an activity) and looks at movement culture as an individual deciding what to do from a set of historical and socially cultivated norms. Larsson and Karlefors also define the different movement cultures that are within physical activity as sport logic, sport-technique logic, keep-fit logic, and dance logic. The authors then go on to investigate the physical education movement culture in Swedish schools by identifying the different logics and how they are pursued/changed within a lesson. They do so by taking videos of 30 physical education lessons. Then reviewing the videos for structure, communication of purpose and how attention is directed towards the activity. The authors identified a pattern from the videos as a ‘looks-like’ pattern. This pattern is where the activities look similar to what they are supposed to but when taking a closer observation is not actually the activity. Larsson and Karlefors discuss three different looks-like movement cultures through the eyes of sport logic, keep-fit logic and dance logic. Overall, their finding are that the learning objectives for the lesson are vague and that there is little time dedicated to learning a specific activity overall which is similar to their discussion earlier of the shortcomings of physical education system. The authors also identify that students are left to figure most things out on their own which diminishes the learning aspect of physical education. I think that this paper is a good example of taking movement culture and identifying how it is not only a social aspect of our lives but also how to learn movement culture. Physical education in schools is a primary way for many to learn about movement culture. The authors provide a better understanding of how to integrate learning into physical education rather than just as a training session. by Elisabeth NationsIn Chapter 7 of The Encultured Brain, Dr. Pettinen presents a case study on Taijutsu, a form of Japanese martial arts that is explicitly focused on perception rather than bodily movement and muscle memory. Taijutsu emphasizes the synchronization of the body and mind so that a person moves in relation to another person in the most efficient and seamless way possible. Taijutsu is based on an epistemology of the body that is very different from the general epistemological understanding of the body in North America, and this is best illustrated by the practice of sakki, an activity tests the practitioner’s ability to stay concentrated and relaxed while judging a very small amount of physical stimulus to determine when to react. Overall, sakki proves Taijutsu’s emphasis on feeling rather than doing or seeing. This is very different from our North American reliance on visual cues and muscle memory – while muscle memory might help the practitioner roll out from under the sword cut, sakki is much more about being able to perceive the movement of the sword.
Taijutsu practitioners do practice repetitive movements as a way of learning the sport, but this is not the focus. Instead, the person being attacked must maintain the most focus on perceiving their environment. As one advanced Taijutsu practitioner described, “It’s not about the repetition. You have to learn the feeling of it” (Pettinen 206). Pettinen argues that because Taijutsu is so much about perception, an fMRI might reveal that expert Taijutsu practitioners actually have a reduction in brain activity compared to novice practitioners because they may have less neural scaffolding than in a novice focused on obtaining muscle memory. I very much disagree with this, as it seems to me that there is far more brain activity involved in observing, measuring, and evaluating a hundred minute aspects of one’s environment and then picking the correct form of muscle memory than in just relying on muscle memory based on the observation of less stimuli. In her conclusion, Pettinen suggests that sensation is much more important in having physical skill than in muscle memory and motor skills. She argues that motor skills are only useful when there are used as an extension of what we perceive. I think her assertions are true in part. In certain activities, like martial arts, perception is much more important than just repetition because one is engaging with another person and responding to their actions. In other scenarios, I believe motor skills may be much more important than sensation, like when weight-lifting. Picking up a bar and engaging your muscles to lift it doesn’t require much perception at all, but it still demonstrates a great depth of physical skill. I think that most of the time people must maintain a balance between muscle memory and perception when engaging in physical activity. In ballet, a dancer must perform the movements she’s spent hours committing to memory, but she must also vary her movements to complement the music and the other dancers. In a much more basic example, when we walk every day, the act of walking is based on muscle memory, but we must adapt that movement according to changes in our environment, like a steep hill, an incoming crowd of people, etc. Pettinen presents a very interesting example of how our understanding of the body affects movement, how movement relates to perception, and how the balance between the two can be seen neurologically. While I don’t agree with some of her statements about how Taijutsu affects the brain, I appreciate how she analyzes and compares the cultural aspects of people’s understanding of the body, even if her evidence for how these epistemologies come into place are somewhat unsubstantiated. by Vanessa Marshall“Theory and method at the intersection of anthropology and cultural neuroscience” by Rebecca Seligman and Ryan Brown builds the idea of cultural neuroscience as the marriage of cultural anthropology and neuroscience. The ideas presented are very similar to the ideas that have been discussed in class: combining aspects of anthropology observational research with more scientific experimental methodologies. Anthropologists’ contributions are built around the idea of embodiment – the way that socio-cultural factors influence form, behavior, and subjective experience of human bodies. Social cognitive neuroscientists’ contributions are built around revealing the mechanisms of embodiment by investigating the neural underpinnings and consequences of social experience. Embodiment in culture is recognized as lacking biological and cognitive mechanisms through which to process bodily function and experience via social processes. Biological anthropologists are acknowledged as having made use of sophisticated measurements, but the results are static outcomes of social forces rather than indicators of how physiological systems function dynamically within the realm of social experience.
The authors specifically build on three “interconnected domains of inquiry in which the intersection of neuroscience and anthropology can productively inform our understanding of the relationship between human brains and their socio-cultural contexts: the social construction of emotion, cultural psychiatry, and the embodiment of ritual.” They also advocate the development of field studies that use portable measurement technologies to connect individual patterns of biological response with socio-cultural processes. by Brian RiveraOn this paper, Nuñez introduces a debate about the nature of mathematics. On one side there is the biological nativist view that argues that ‘mathematical objects’ along with the intuitions of space, time, and quantity are the result of millions of years of evolution. On the other side is the cultural view, which states that number capacities are based on biologically evolved preconditions (BEPs) which are scaffolded by culture to create number and arithmetic (thus them not being biologically inherited but culturally developed).
The main analogy running through the paper is that of snowboarding. Both snowboarding and arithmetic have biologically evolved preconditions: motor-balance for snowboarding and subitizing for arithmetic. These BEP are evolved or were selected for at one point of evolution. However, Nuñez goes on to make the point that although snowboarding’s BEPs have evolved they are not precursors of it. Similarly with number and mathematical abilities, their BEPs have evolved but are not necessarily precursors for them. One reason Nuñez sees as contributing to the embrace of the nativist view of mathematics is that studies have downplayed data from non-industrialized cultures. Languages from some hunter-gatherer cultures show there can be a complete absence of exact quantifiers. This questions the conclusion that individual humans manifest a specific capacity for number. An additional reason to doubt the nativist view of mathematics according to Nuñez is due to the overextension of conclusions derived from animal studies. These studies hardly resemble the conditions any animal would encounter in its natural habitat and seem ill fitted to drive conclusions about biological capacities. Furthermore, Nuñez goes on to say that numerical cognition has collapsed the concepts of number, numeral, numerousness, and numerosity. Nuñez proposes making a distinction between quantical and numerical abilities to distinguish the biologically endowed abilities of the former from the learned-cultural ones of the latter. A criticism that seems relevant is the degree to which snowboarding is a fair analogy to criticize teleological arguments. The way in which some mathematical facts seem transcendental of human notions (i.e. infinity), discovered rather than created, and retrospectively useful have led many to make those claims of numbers being God-given or existing in Plato’s heaven. Although some people might feel this way about snowboarding, it is far from being known as the zenith of human sensory-motor coordination and it is but an example of this capacity. Snowboarding is too concrete of a case to talk about the evolved capacities for balance and motor-coordination. This contrast with mathematics being a widely adapted (possibly universal), unique, and successful abstraction system, it is not just a different type of writing. To have made the analogy to “sports” would have sustained the points about the cultural properties of snowboarding while giving justice to the fact that mathematics is not just a happenstance abstraction system. Nuñez brings a critical view on the attempts to describe numerical abilities in terms of evolution. Additionally, Nuñez treats the interaction between culture and biology very seriously. I think this article is a good example of the dynamical view necessary to make sense of the complex history of a modern cognitive skill such as arithmetic. by Janae HunterIn this article, Lynn and his colleagues attempt to talk about educating undergraduate students about neuroanthropology. One of the main issues brought up is the oversimplification of certain topics which can sometimes lead to misunderstanding. One example the authors used to illustrate this point is the display of horse evolution. Lynn and his colleagues discuss Holley’s (2009) approach of teaching neuroanthropology with an interdisciplinary approach. They used The Human Behavioral Ecology Research Group (HBERG) here at the University to break down the Holley’s approach. Through the HBERG, Lynn was able to teach student neuroanthropology through a hands on learning experience. The students were able to conduct two research projects: The Religious Ecology Study and the Fireside Relaxation Study. The Religious Ecology Study gave students a chance to combine cultural anthropology and field experience. In this project the students were immersed in the church culture in Tuscaloosa and in Costa Rica in order to better understand how the church functions and how to conduct field studies. In this study the students had to record their findings in workbooks. The Fireside Relaxation Study incorporated more of the neuroscience aspect, by trying to test the relaxing effects of fire. The students monitored the blood pressure, heart rate, skin conductance and prefrontal cortical brain activity of the subject’s while they were presented with different recordings of fire with and without sound. This blend of lab techniques and field studies is important to teaching and understanding the practice of neuroanthropology.
I think this article is great for expressing how to teach undergraduate student neuroanthropology, but it doesn’t really add anything to our understanding of neuroanthropology as a discipline. I loved how the article broke down Holley’s interdisciplinary approach to teaching neuroanthropology, because it involves such a hands on approach. During the reading, I had a few questions:
by Kaitlyn MayIn this article, the authors argue that though neuroanthropology is typically thought of as a new field, in reality it is simply a new way of approaching traditional anthropology. As such, the authors argue that neuroanthropology should not be thought of as separate from traditional anthropology.
Using previous calls for cultural neurophenomenology, “a neural theory of culture and a cultural theory of the brain,” as the backbone of their argument, the authors begin by clearly laying out the importance of understanding human experience and the effect of such experiences on the brain. The authors of this paper argue that because culture is embedded in experience. Furthermore, the interaction of experience, the brain, and culture, cannot be separated, and thus their interaction must be critically examined. Still, neuroanthropology is challenged by the need to employ traditional neuroscience methods in a naturalistic setting. Traditional neural methods, such as fMRI and EEG, are highly constrained by the lack of mobility of the equipment and of the participant. The cumbersome equipment makes it difficult for these methodologies to be seamlessly blended into a natural environment. This starkly juxtaposes to the aims of anthropology to assimilate into a given environment without changing it in order to achieve an understanding of ‘lived experience’. Thus, the authors argue, the tension between the ideals of method and the realities of research is heightened in neuroanthropology. Still, interaction in between the two fields is critical to the advancement of not just neuroanthropology, but of research as a whole. The authors blame the lack of communication between academic departments as producing the hesitancy to interdisciplinary fields, such as neuroanthropology. Here, the authors argue for Gallagher’s (2003) notion of front-loading concepts into an experimental design as crucial to facilitating interaction between anthropology and neuroscience. Providing multiple examples of its benefit, the authors suggest that this practice may be necessary to neuroanthropology by providing a framework to an experiment. This may help “personalize” the experimental design so that the value of personal experience is not lost in the quest to obtain scientific data. In other words, the authors argue that front-loading will not let the data be stripped of the unique experiences of the people that it was collected from. The authors conclude by emphasizing the importance of not letting experimental methodologies, like neural imaging, transform subjects into objective data points, and instead let the experiential accounts of these subjects inform the meaning of the data. The authors end the paper by emphasizing their support of the field of neuroanthropology and arguing for a broader conceptualization of the field. The authors argue that neuroanthropology is not so much a new, hybrid field, but a sequential development of traditional anthropology. Defining neuroanthropology as its own, new field may cause those involved to neglect the knowledge, experience, and teaching that anthropology offers—both practically, in terms of methods, and conceptually, by viewing themselves as unrelated to traditional anthropology. If neuroanthropology strays too far from anthropology, it may be that it develops into a subfield of neuroscience and in doing so loses the emphasis of structuring data by understanding of human experience. As someone within another interdisciplinary field, Educational Neuroscience, this discussion sounds all too familiar. So often the ideals of neuroscience methodology struggle to match the realities of educational practice. It seems to me that neuroanthropology is experiencing a similar conflict, and I am eager to know your thoughts on it.
by Leah FontaineIn chapter four, Greg Downey and Daniel H. Lende discuss the human brain and the many theories that talk about how and why humans have evolved differently than other primates. It begins by discussing the correlation between brain and body size in many animals and how humans have a disproportionately large brain compared to the body. While other mammals have developed better systems for eating and reproduction, human's brain size has caused potential problems in both highly necessary features of survival. The disproportionate aspects of our brain doesn't stop at its total size however, and can be seen even in the size of the different parts of our brain especially the neocortex. The chapter goes on to discuss how the connections in the brain create many of the differences we see both physically and that create some of our abilities culturally. Changes in environment can greatly affect the connections that developing brains make and with humans developing so much outside of the womb there are many differences between people. Humans are a very social species which has helped develop the distinctive way that our brains work. Children are dependent on others to take care of them and this long time of dependency gives humans the chance to teach offspring more and provides opportunities for more diversity. Our ability to pass down our knowledge allows us to build on it. This along with our ability to empathize and work with each other has shaped how our brain has developed.
With my background mostly centering around culture and religion, this chapter makes me think more about childrearing and the way that has a lasting impact on all humans. I'm interested in what ways environment and culture can create and change different connections in the brain and how drastic these differences can be especially when looking at those who have experienced trauma or abuse. by Casey FulkersonIn “Evolution of the Primate Brain,” Falk seeks to answer the question of “how humans came to be the largest-brained primate but also the most intelligent species on Earth” (Falk, 2014 pg. 1496). To best answer this question, we must study the evolution of the primate brain and the adaptations made early in primate brain evolution and how those early adaptations have influenced brain physiology of primates and humans. This is done by direct and comparative methods. The direct method is to study endocasts, or casts of the interior of braincases. These can be physical, fossilized endocasts and virtual endocasts created by 3DCT data, both allowing for the study of living and extinct species of primates (pg. 1498). The comparative methods are used to study living species and include histochemical, immunocytochemical, positron emission tomography (PET) scans, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) scans. Using these methods, researchers can learn about neurons, including their types, sizes, densities, distributions, and connections, and about functional processing in the brain and how it works in terms of movement, sensation, sleep, preparation for action, thinking, and emotions (pg. 1499).
Apparently, there is some division among paleoanthropologists regarding the importance of absolute brain size and brain reorganization. Specifically, the argument is about which is superior. Falk provides in-depth analysis of both areas. In the sections devoted to the evolution of primate brain size, Falk discusses how to best interpret primate brain size, which is quite the undertaking due to the wide variation among primates. This wide range of brain size makes comparative study between primates difficult, so relative brain size, or RBS as it is referred to as in Falk’s paper, is used. RBS is a ratio between brain and body size. Falk discusses the methods that comparative studies use to eliminate the effects of allometric scaling on the brain. The quotients mentioned are the index of progression (IP) developed by Bauchot and Stephan and Jerison’s encephalization quotient (EQ). It should be noted that EQ heavily depends on the group being studied for baseline data and can easily overestimate the EQ of smaller-bodied species and underestimate the EQ of larger-bodied species (pg. 1501, 1503). In later sections further delving into brain size of primates, Falk discusses studies done by Leigh that investigated two life-history strategies and their effects on infant brain grown and also two hypotheses that attempt to explain why primates (humans are included in this too) are able to grow large energetically expensive brains (the maternal energy hypothesis proposes that the mother’s basal metabolic rate during gestation determines neonatal brain mass and the expensive-tissue hypothesis says that encephalization is able to occur because of an evolutionary “trade-off” where amount of brain tissue has increased while the mass of other energetically expensive organs, like the heart, gut, liver, and kidneys has decreased) (pg. 1503-04). It should be noted that both hypotheses do not hold for bats and so their broader application in mammals is questionable. Falk also gives an overview of encephalization in hominins, providing the detailed Table 1 on pages 1506 and 1507. Table 1 lists cranial capacities for Hominins as evidence to show the encephalization of hominin brains, but Falk says on page 1505 that “error may be introduced, however, because fossil endocasts are rarely whole and, thus, usually require partial reconstruction.” Later he writes “Although many workers have estimated EQ’s for fossil hominins, these estimates must be taken with a grain of salt because of the difficulty of determining surrogates for body mass” (Falk 2014, pg. 1507). Few intact femurs of hominins provide few accurate measures for determining body mass and size and therefore RBS. Falk also discusses neurological reorganization because many believe that “size along is not enough to account for the observed diversity in primate behavior and that circuitry, neurochemistry, and subsystems must have been reorganized within brains to accommodate evolving behavioral repertoire” (pg. 1509). On page 1514 he mentions a study done by Semendegeri which dispels the idea that humans have abnormally large frontal lobes, which are larger due to allometric scaling, not because humans have better cognitive abilities (pg. 1514). It is also important to note that Neurological reorganization was not isolated to one area but was instead spread across multiple structures in the brain, dispelling the idea of a “mosaic evolution” evolution of the brain (pg. 1512). This is supported by the fact that high-order cognitive tasks engage areas of the brain across the cortical mantle and are not focused on one specific area (pg. 1512). Falk also mentions the role of mirror neurons in manual and orofacial communication in apes and humans and emphasizes the role of cortical asymmetries that are related to unique human behaviors like the tendency of right-handedness, symbolic language, and humanlike abilities for music, art, and technology (pg. 1516). Given that this is a Neuroanthropology class, the question of how this relates to Neuroanthropology and to the human brain should be at the forefront of our minds. This article seeks to answer the question of how humans came to be not only the largest-brained primate, but also the most intelligent - without ever having defined what, for the purposes of this paper, qualifies or quantifies the term “intelligence” or reaching any real conclusions. This is a valuable paper filled with information about endocasts and direct and comparative methods and the incredible range in primate brain size and the theorized ways that primates were able to support such an energetically expensive organ, but the answer to the ultimate question, how humans came to be the largest-brained primate and most intelligent animal, remains unanswered. We have theories and suggestions that seem to have merit because of the genetic closeness of humans and primates, but we do not have any concrete data that confirms these hypotheses. Paper: Falk, D. (2014), Evolution of the Primate Brain. Handbook of Paleoanthropology, 1495:1518. by Kaitlyn MayFriederici (2017) provides a comprehensive review of research exploring the evolution of language. By reviewing structural and functional neuroanatomical differences between the primate and mature human brain, as well as comparisons between the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of language-relevant brain structures, Friederici provides a relevant timeline of the neural basis of language evolution while highlighting the specific aspects of language and neural structures which underpin this ability.
Friederici begins with a brief overview of the differing ways in which researchers define language. This then moves into a complex discussion of the computational mechanisms for human language. Though this section may be a bit daunting to those who are not well-versed in the language literature, Friederici does an admirable job breaking down difficult topics. Essentially, some researchers define language as all aspects of communication (facial expressions, hearing language, processing, etc.) while others focus specifically on the computational mechanisms behind how language is built. It is this construction aspect, and the complications of advanced grammar, that separates nonhuman primates from humans. Friederici then begins reviewing studies of the neural mechanisms of human language. These studies overview differences in acquiring grammar systems in human and nonhuman primates, as well as the neurobiological bases of these grammar types. These studies conclude that the ability to master phrase structure grammar is uniquely human. Moreover, these studies highlight the neural mechanisms of language processing. Friederici first overviews the role of the posterior portion of Broca’s area (Brodmann area [BA 44]) in not only syntactic hierarchy building, but in the evolutionary pathway of language. Next, Friederici discusses the role of the inferior frontal gyrus, posterior temporal cortex, and the white matter fiber bundles connecting them to processing syntactically complex sentences. The paper then moves into a review of cross-species comparisons of language. To date, there is no evidence that other species can process and learn hierarchically structured sequences. Friederici begins by noting that the posterior temporal cortex is larger in the left than the right hemisphere of both the human and chimpanzee brain, reflecting the left lateralization of language. In contrast, Broca’s area demonstrates distinct differences between cytoarchitecture, asymmetry, and developmental trajectories of human and nonhuman primates. Moreover, the dorsal pathway, a crucial pathway for the language ability in adult humans, is much weaker in nonhuman primates than in humans. These differences are postulated to reflect the behavioral trajectories in child language development as well as the lack of these behaviors in nonhuman primates. Friederici concludes that the differing asymmetries may be crucial to understanding the evolution of language. Friederici (2017) provides an in-depth review to the neural circuits underlying the evolutionary pathway towards human language. Although does an excellent job reviewing a large body of relevant studies, the author neglects to include studies which indicate abilities of nonhuman primates to acquire human language skills, such as those in which chimpanzees learn to use American Sign Language (ASL). Although these studies typically admit limitations in the nonhuman primates abilities, they are still noteworthy to the evolution of language. Still, what Friederici does do nicely is provide a comprehensive understanding of the exact piece of language which is distinctly human—the ability to process and learn hierarchically structured sequences. Reference: Friederici, A. D. (2017). Evolution of the neural language network, Psychonomics Bulletin and Review, 24, 41-47. |
AuthorThis blog is group authored by Dr. DeCaro and the students in his ANT 474/574: Neuroanthropology. Archives
April 2019
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